FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility ConditionsOpen
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Teslaâs Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the systemâs ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Teslaâs assessment of their safety impact. Teslaâs FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on…
EA26002 · opened Mar 18, 2026Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engagedOpen
The Office of Defects Investigation (âODIâ) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traï¬c safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traï¬c laws. ODIâs investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving…
PE25012 · opened Oct 7, 2025Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting RequirementsOpen
The Office of Defects Investigation (âODIâ) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (âTeslaâ) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the âSGOâ), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Teslaâs data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit…
AQ25002 · opened Aug 20, 2025Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.Closed
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident.…
PE24033 · opened Jan 6, 2025 · closed Apr 3, 2026FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility ConditionsClosed
On October 17, 2024, NHTSAâs Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Teslaâs Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Teslaâs assessment of their safety impact. Teslaâs FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that…
PE24031 · opened Oct 17, 2024 · closed Mar 18, 2026Recall 23V838 Remedy EffectivenessOpen
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Teslaâs Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Teslaâs Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that âthe prominence and scope of the systemâs controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,â and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Teslaâs Autopilot…
RQ24009 · opened Apr 25, 2024Sudden Unintended AccelerationOpen
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
DP23002 · opened Jun 29, 2023Defect Petition Interlock RequestClosed
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a ârecall of all Tesla carsâ produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driverâs foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things,…
DP23001 · opened Apr 7, 2023 · closed Mar 18, 2026Pedestrian alert soundsClosedLed to recall 22V063000
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review…
DP22005 · opened Jan 27, 2023 · closed Aug 7, 2023Autopilot System Driver ControlsClosedLed to recall 23V085
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Teslaâs Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driverâs supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise…
EA22002 · opened Jun 8, 2022 · closed Apr 25, 2024Desiccated Air Bag Inflator RuptureOpen
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled…
EA21002 · opened Sep 17, 2021Autopilot & First Responder ScenesClosed
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during…
PE21020 · opened Aug 13, 2021 · closed Jun 8, 2022Fore Link FailureClosed
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identified 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February…
PE20020 · opened Nov 22, 2020 · closed Aug 12, 2024Loss of rearview cameraClosedLed to recall 21V035
On November 20, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA) 20-003 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-18 Tesla Model S and model year (MY) 2016-2018 Tesla Model X vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. During its investigation, ODI learned that the expected usage life rating for the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device is approximately 3,000 âP/Eâ or Program-Erase cycles, after which the eMMC NAND flash memory device would become fully consumed and no longer be operational, leading to a failure of the media control unit (MCU). At a daily cycle usage rate of 1.4 per block, accumulation of 3,000 P/E cycles would take only 5-6 years. Historically, the expected life of a vehicle generally far exceeds…
EA20003 · opened Nov 12, 2020 · closed May 2, 2024Loss of rearview cameraClosed
On June 22, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE20-010 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-2015 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. EMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles. The subject MCU allegedly fails prematurely due to memory wear-out of the eMMC NAND flash. Tesla used the same MCU with the Tegra 3 processor in approximately 159 thousand 2012-2018 Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles built by Tesla through early-2018. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE20-010, Tesla provided ODI with 2,399 complaints and field reports, 7,777 warranty claims, and 4,746 non-warranty claims related to MCU…
PE20010 · opened Jun 22, 2020 · closed Nov 22, 2020Sudden Unintended AccelerationClosed
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log…
DP20001 · opened Jan 13, 2020 · closed Jan 8, 2021Battery Management Software UpdatesClosed
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject…
DP19005 · opened Oct 1, 2019 · closed Sep 28, 2021Automatic vehicle control systemsClosed
On May 7, 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer crossing an uncontrolled intersection on a highway west of Williston, Florida, resulting in fatal injuries to the Tesla driver.Data obtained from the Model S indicated that:1) the Tesla was being operated in Autopilot mode at the time of the collision; 2) the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or automated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, steering or other actions to avoid the collision.On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to ?examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.?The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) analyzed the following subjects as part of NHTSA?s examination of the design and performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system:1) Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system design and…
PE16007 · opened Jun 28, 2016 · closed Jan 19, 2017
